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Abstract
The Shapley-Shubik index was designed to evaluate the power distribution in commit-
tee systems drawing binary decisions and is one of the most established power indices. It
was generalized to decisions with more than two levels of approval in the input and out-
put. In the limit we have a continuum of options. For these games with interval decisions
we prove an axiomatization of a power measure and show that the Shapley-Shubik index
for simple games, as well as for (j, k) simple games, occurs as a special discretization.
This relation and the closeness of the stated axiomatization to the classical case suggests
to speak of the Shapley-Shubik index for games with interval decisions, that can also be
generalized to a value.
Key words: simple games, decisions with a continuum of options, aggregation functions,
power indices, Shapley-Shubik index
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1 Introduction
Consider a committee, which jointly draws decisions by voting and aggregating the votes to a
common outcome. The case that is studied mostly in the literature is that of binary decisions,
i.e., for a given proposal each committee member can either vote “yes” or “no”. The aggregated
group decision then also is either to accept the proposal and implement it or to dismiss the
proposal and retain the status quo. In the case of heterogeneous committee members the
question of their respective influence on the group decision arises. Taking just the formal
specification of the given voting rule into account, a measurement for influence is called a
power index. A rather comprehensive and widely applied class of voting rules is that of simple
1Department of Mathematics, Physics and Computer Science, University of Bayreuth, 95440 Bayreuth,
Germany Tel.: +49-921-557353 Fax: +49-921-557352. E–mail: sascha.kurz@uni-bayreuth.de
2 Advanced Teachers Training College, University of Yaounde I, PO Box 47 Yaounde, Cameroon
3Research and Training Unit for Doctorate in Mathematics, Computer Sciences and Applications, University
of Yaounde I, PO Box 812, Yaounde, Cameroon
1
ar
X
iv
:1
90
7.
01
32
3v
1 
 [c
s.G
T]
  2
 Ju
l 2
01
9
games. One of the most established power indices for simple games is the Shapley-Shubik index
[28].
However, not all decisions are binary. Abstaining from a vote might be seen as a third option
for the committee members. In general, there might also be any number j ≥ 2 of alternatives
that can be chosen from. To this end, simple games were generalized to (j, k) simple games
[12], where j is the number of alternatives in the input, i.e., the voting possibilities, and k the
number of alternatives for the group decision. A Shapley-Shubik power index for (3, 2) simple
games was introduced in [7, pp. 291–293]. When discussing the so-called roll call model for the
Shapley-Shubik index, we will see that certain biases of the voters to “yes” or “no”-votes do
not matter for the Shapley-Shubik index for simple games. This changes if voters have at least
a third option. So given some probability that voters do not abstain, Friedman and Parker
consider a conditional Shapley-Shubik power index for (3, 2) simple games [14]. For general
(j, k) simple games a Shapley-Shubik power index was introduced in [9]. For a variant with
a different notion of monotonicity see [18]. For completeness, we mention that [2] considers a
Shapley value for r unordered alternatives in the input. Axiomatizations are still under the
way and mainly consider special cases.
In some applications, i.e., tax rates, we have a continuum of options, which might be
modeled by a real number. The aggregation of n different real numbers to a single real number
was studied in the literature under the name of aggregation functions, see e.g. [15]. Mimicking
the properties of a simple game we speak of interval simple games for real-valued decisions in
[0, 1]. A generalization of the Shapley-Shubik index to that context was proposed in [20]. Here
we give an axiomatic justification for that power index. Moreover, we show that simple games
as well as (j, k) simple games are covered by interval simple games using a natural embedding.
This gives a coherent story condensing the different variants for committee decisions in one
common framework.
As further related work one might mention considerations for other power indices. An
axiomatization of a Banzhaf index for (j, k) simple games was obtained in [8]. For games with
abstention, (3, 2) simple games, the ordinal equivalence between the Shapley-Shubik and the
Banzhaf index has been studied in [29]. Further influence measures have been studied in [16],
see also [10]. Models of influence for a continuum of actions have e.g. been studied in [1, 17].
For aggregation functions there is a known generalization of the (Penrose-)Banzhaf index [15],
see also [22] for more details on the relationship.
The remaining part of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the basic
notions, i.e., we consider committee decisions in Subsection 2.1, power indices in Subsection 2.2,
and the roll call model in Subsection 2.3. The generalization of the Shapley-Shubik index to
interval simple games is studied in Section 3. The main part, i.e., an axiomatization of that
index is given in Section 4. After studying the first basic properties and observing that the
classical axioms are not sufficient to uniquely characterize the index, we introduce the new
axiom (HIS) of homogeneous increments sharing in Subsection 4.1. In terms of simple games
this axiom corresponds to the axiom (SymGL) of symmetric gain-loss [25, p. 93]. Technically
we will work with step functions, which can approximate any reasonable general function.
Assuming that a power index is commutable with the limit of step functions, we end up with
an axiomatization, see Theorem 2 in Subsection 4.2. In order to illustrate the technical details
and subtleties we give a detailed example in the appendix. In Section 5 we close the paper with
a conclusion.
2
2 Preliminaries
Let N = {1, 2, ..., n} be a finite set of voters. Any non-empty subset S of N is called a coalition
and the set of all coalitions of N is denoted by 2N . For easier reading capital letters are reserved
for coalitions (such as N , S, T , J , K, . . . ), while the corresponding small letters (n, s, t, j, k,
. . . ) denote their respective cardinalities. By Sn we denote the set of permutations of length
n, i.e., the bijections on N .
2.1 Committee decisions
A most easy framework for committee decisions are binary decisions, i.e., each committee
member can either vote “no” or “yes” on a given proposal, while the group decision then is
either to reject or to accept the proposal. This setting is commonly formalized by a simple game
v (on N), which is a mapping v : 2N → {0, 1} such that v(∅) = 0, v(N) = 1, and v(S) ≤ v(T )
for all coalitions ∅ ⊆ S ⊆ T ⊆ N . Here S ⊆ N collects all players that are voting “yes” and
we have v(S) = 1 iff coalition S can bring trough the proposal. If v(S) = 1, then coalition S
is called winning and losing otherwise. By [q;w1, . . . , wn] we denote the simple game whose
winning coalitions are exactly those with w(S) :=
∑
i∈S wi ≥ q. In this case we also speak of
a weighted game (with weights w1, . . . , wn and quota q). The term simple refers to the fact
that there are just two options in the input as well as in the output. In some older literature a
simple game does not need to satisfy the monotonicity assumption v(S) ≤ v(T ) and one speaks
of monotonic simple games if it does. However, the monotonicity assumption is quite natural
for most decisions, since it only requires that additional supporters for a proposal do not turn
acceptance into rejection. We follow the more recent literature and just speak of simple games.
In several applications decisions are not binary. One may think of grades or situations
where abstention is possible. To this end, in [12], see also [13], the authors have introduced
(j, k) simple games, which map the selection of n voters for j possible levels of approval to
k possible outputs. We slightly reformulate their definition. For J = {0, 1, . . . , j − 1} and
K = {0, 1, . . . , k − 1}, where j, k ≥ 2, a (j, k) simple game v (on N) is a mapping v : Jn → K
with v(0, . . . , 0) = 0, v(j − 1, . . . , j − 1) = k − 1, and v(x) ≤ v(y) for all x, y ∈ Jn with x ≤ y.
Here we write x ≤ y for x, y ∈ Rn if xi ≤ yi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. A (2, 2)-simple game is isomorphic
to a simple game. Note that the input levels from J , as well as the output levels from K, are
assumed to be ordered to make the monotonicity condition meaningful. For r unordered input
alternatives, see e.g. [5].
If we rescale the input and output levels of a (j, k) simple game to 1
j−1 · (0, . . . , j − 1) and
1
k−1 · (0, . . . , k − 1),4 respectively, then the input and output levels are both contained in the
real interval [0, 1] between 0 and 1. Increasing j and k approximates [0, 1], so that we may
consider its limit [0, 1] itself. So, we want to study [0, 1]n → [0, 1]-functions v with v(0) = 0,
v(1) = 1, and v(x) ≤ v(y) for all x, y ∈ [0, 1]n with x ≤ y. In [20] the author called those objects
continuous simple games since, for simplicity, v was assumed to be continuous. To go in line
with the above naming we call them interval simple games here5. Without the monotonicity
assumption v(x) ≤ v(y) and the domain restriction to [0, 1] those functions are more widely
4Technically we will use a slightly different scaling, see Footnote 7.
5In [22] they were called simple aggregation functions, so that in any case the naming should be considered
as temporary.
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known under the name aggregation function, see e.g. [15]. The name says it, an aggregation
function takes n real numbers as inputs and condenses them to a single real number. Examples
are direct votes on e.g., top tax rates or pension contributions, i.e., real numbers from some
interval can be directly named instead of approving or disapproving some concrete proposal. If
the real-valued alternatives are ordered by their usual order, then the monotonicity assumption
makes sense again. In the voting context, the weighted median is a reasonable aggregation
function, see e.g. [23] for the assignment of fair weights in the corresponding two-tier context.
Mathematically, also a function like e.g. v(x1, . . . , xn) =
∏n
i=1 x
i
i falls into the class of interval
simple games. With respect to the restriction to the specific interval [0, 1] we note that this
can be achieved by rescaling, so that we retain this here due to simplicity. However, higher
dimensional policy spaces are significantly different from our setting.
2.2 Power indices
Even if the case where a simple game v is weighted, influence or power is not always reasonably
reflected by the weights. This fact is well-known and triggered the invention of power indices,
i.e., mappings from a simple game on n players to Rn reflecting the influence of a player on
the final group decision. One of the most established power indices is the Shapley-Shubik index
[28]. It can be defined via
SSIi(v) =
∑
i∈S⊆N
(s− 1)!(n− s)!
n!
· [v(S)− v(S\ {i})] (1)
for all players i ∈ N . If v(S) − v(S\{i}) = 1, then we have v(S) = 1 and v(S\{i}) = 0 in
a simple game and voter i is called a swing voter. In the next subsection we give another
equivalent formulation for SSIi(v) based on the so-called roll call model, where pivotality plays
the essential role and nicely motivates the factors (s−1)!(n−s)!
n!
. This interpretation triggers the
definition of a Shapley-Shubik index for (j, k) simple games in [9] and was generalized to interval
simple games in [20].
Another way to characterize power indices are axiomatizations, i.e., sets of properties that
are satisfied by a power index and uniquely characterize it. For the Shapley-Shubik index we
refer to [27, 28]. In order to introduce properties of power indices for all three types of games,
let v be a mapping Jn → K, where J = {0, 1, . . . , j − 1} for some integer j ≥ 2 or J = [0, 1],
and K = {0, 1, . . . , k − 1} for some integer k ≥ 2 or K = [0, 1]. A power index ϕ maps v to
Rn for all v ∈ VnJ,K , where VnJ,K denotes the set of all corresponding games for n players. We
call ϕ positive if ϕ(v) 6= 0 and ϕi(v) ≥ 0 for all v ∈ VnJ,K and all i ∈ N . If
∑n
i=1 ϕi(v) = 1
for all games v, then ϕ is called efficient. A power index ϕ is called anonymous if we have
ϕpi(i)(piv) = ϕi(v) for all permutations pi of N , i ∈ N , and v ∈ VnJ,K , where piv(x) = v(pi(x)) and
pi(x) =
(
xpi(i)
)
i∈N . If pi ∈ Sn is a transposition interchanging player i and player j, then we call
the two players symmetric if piv(x) = v(x) for all x ∈ Jn. A power index ϕ is called symmetric if
ϕi(v) = ϕj(v) for all players i and j that are symmetric in v. Note that symmetry is a relaxation
of anonymity. A player i ∈ N is called a null player if v(x) = v(y) for all x, y ∈ J with xj = yj
for all j ∈ N\{i}, i.e., v(x) does not depend on xi. A power index ϕ is said to satisfy the null
player property if ϕi(v) = 0 for every null player i in v. In general, a function f : Rn ⊇ U → R
is called linear if we have f(αx+ βy) = αf(x) + βf(y) for all x, y ∈ U and α, β ∈ R such that
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αx + βy ∈ U . For simple games (and their generalizations) linear combinations αu + βv of
simple games u and v are almost never a simple game again, so that linearity has been adopted
to the following. A power index ϕ satisfies the transfer property if for all u, v ∈ VnJ,K and all
i ∈ N we have ϕi(u) + ϕi(v) = ϕi(u ∨ v) + ϕi(u ∧ v), where (u ∨ v)(x) = max{u(x), v(x)} and
(u∧v)(x) = min{u(x), v(x)} for all x ∈ Jn. Note that we always have u∨v, u∧v ∈ VnJ,K . With
this we can state that the Shapley-Shubik index for simple games is the unique power index
that is symmetric, efficient, satisfies both the null player property and the transfer property, see
[6]. Moreover, SSI is also positive and anonymous. The more general Shapley value, coinciding
with the Shapley-Shubik index for simple games and having the set of all cooperative games
for n players as domain, is linear.
2.3 The roll call model
In [28] the authors have motivated the Shapley-Shubik index by the following interpretation.
Assume that the n voters row up in a line and declare to be part in the coalition of “yes”-voters.
Given an ordering of the players, the player that first guarantees that a proposal can be put
through is then called pivotal. Considering all n! orderings pi ∈ Sn of the players with equal
probability then gives a probability for being pivotal for a given player i ∈ N that equals its
Shapley-Shubik index. So we can rewrite Equation (1) to
SSIi(v) =
1
n!
·
∑
pi∈Sn
(
v({j ∈ N : pi(j) ≤ pi(i)})− v({j ∈ N : pi(j) < pi(i)})
)
. (2)
Setting Sipi := {j ∈ N : pi(j) ≤ pi(i)} we have Sipi = S for exactly (s− 1)!(n− s)! permutations
pi ∈ Sn and an arbitrary set {i} ⊆ S ⊆ N , so that Equation (1) is just a simplification of
Equation (2).
Instead of assuming that all players vote “yes” one can also assume that all players vote
“no”. In [26] it is mentioned that the model also yields the same result if we assume that all
players independently vote “yes” with a fixed probability p ∈ [0, 1]. This was further generalized
to probability measures p on {0, 1}n where vote vectors with the same number of “yes” votes
have the same probability, see [19]. In other words, individual votes may be interdependent but
must be exchangeable. That no further probability measures lead to the Shapley-Shubik index
was finally shown in [24]. For the most symmetric case p = 1
2
we can rewrite Equation (2) to
SSIi(v) =
1
n! · 2n ·
∑
(pi,x)∈Sn×{0,1}n
M(v, (pi, x), i), (3)
where M(v, (pi, x), i) is one if player i is pivotal for ordering pi and vote vector x in v, see [24],
and zero otherwise.
Being pivotal means that the vote of player i, according to the ordering pi and the votes of
the previous players, fixes the group decision for the first time. In a (j, k) simple game we can
have the same notation as long as there are just k = 2 outputs. If k > 2, then pushing the
outcome to at least h or at most h − 1 are possible events for h ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, so that we
speak of an h-pivotal player, which is always unique, see [9]. In that paper the author defines
1
n! · jn · (k − 1)
k−1∑
h=1
|{(pi, x) ∈ Sn × Jn : i is an h-pivot for pi and x in v}| , (4)
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for all i ∈ N , as the Shapley-Shubik index for (j, k) simple games. Using monotonicity the
h-pivotality as well as M(v, (pi, x), i) can be stated more directly. Slightly abusing notation
we write 0 ∈ Rn and 1 ∈ Rn for the vectors that entirely consist of zeroes and entries j − 1,
respectively. For each ∅ ⊆ S ⊆ N we write xS for the restriction of x ∈ Rn to (xi)i∈S. As
an abbreviation, we write x−S = xN\S. For a given permutation pi ∈ Sn and i ∈ N , we set
pi<i = {j ∈ N : pi(j) < pi(i)}, pi≤i = {j ∈ N : pi(j) ≤ pi(i)}, pi>i = {j ∈ N : pi(j) > pi(i)}, and
pi≥i = {j ∈ N : pi(j) ≥ pi(i)}. With this, we can rewrite (4) to
1
n!·jn ·(k − 1)
∑
(pi,x)∈Sn×Jn
([
v(xpi<i ,1pi≥i)− v(xpi<i ,0pi≥i)
]− [v(xpi≤i ,1pi>i)− v(xpi≤i ,0pi>i)]). (5)
The interpretation is as follows. Since v is monotone, before the vote of player i exactly
the values in
{
v(xpi<i ,0pi≥i), . . . , v(xpi<i ,1pi≥i)
}
are still possible as final group decision. After
the vote of player i this interval eventually shrinks to
{
v(xpi≤i ,0pi>i), . . . , v(xpi≤i ,1pi>i)
}
. The
difference in (5) just computes the difference between the lengths of both intervals, i.e., the
number of previously possible outputs that can be excluded for sure after the vote of player i.
In order to simplify (5) a bit, let C(v, T ) = 1
jn(k−1) ·
∑
x∈Jn
(
v(1T , x−T ) − v(0T , x−T )
)
for
all T ⊆ N . As in the situation where we simplified the Shapley-Shubik index of a simple game
given by Equation (2) to Equation (1), we observe that it is sufficient to know the sets pi≥i and
pi>i for every permutation pi ∈ Sn. So we can condense all permutations that lead to the same
set and can simplify (5) to∑
i∈S⊆N
(s− 1)!(n− s)!
n!
· [C(v, S)− C(v, S\{i})] . (6)
Note the similarity between (6) and Equation (1). For j = k = 2, i.e., simple games, the
coincidence between v(S)− v(S\ {i}) and the more complicated summation behind C(v, S)−
C(v, S\{i}) is due to the fact that the roll call model gives the same probabilities for p = 1
and p = 1
2
.6 However, this is an artifact for j = 2 and for j > 2 different probabilities for
the input levels, as well as more complicated probability distributions on vote vectors, lead to
different results in the roll call model. The case (j, k) = (3, 2) was studied in more detail in [14],
where the authors defined a conditional Shapley-Shubik index given some fixed probability of
the voters to abstain.
3 A Shapley-Shubik like index for interval decisions
If we renormalize J and K to subsets of [0, 1] and consider the limit taking j and k to infinity,7
then Equation (5) gives a power index for interval simple games.
6A direct combinatorial proof of the underlying identity was also given in [3, 21].
7To be more precisely, we consider the mappings K = {0, 1, . . . , k − 1} → [0, 1], i 7→ i/(k − 1) and J =
{0, 1, . . . , j − 1} → [0, 1], i 7→ (i+ 12) /j. Note that the latter points are the middle points of the intervals
(i/j, (i+ 1)/j) for 0 ≤ i ≤ j − 1, c.f. Footnote 9 and Definition 4.
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Definition 1 (cf. [20, Definition 6.2])
Let v be an interval simple game with player set N and i ∈ N an arbitrary player. We set
Ψi(v) =
1
n!
∑
pi∈Sn
∫ 1
0
· · ·
∫ 1
0
[
v(xpi<i ,1pi≥i)− v(xpi<i ,0pi≥i)
]
− [v(xpi≤i ,1pi>i)− v(xpi≤i ,0pi>i)] dx1 . . . dxn. (7)
We remark that we change between the notations
∫ 1
0
· · · ∫ 1
0
and
∫
[0,1]n
from time to time
taking Fubini’s theorem into account. We skip the question for the existence of the involved
integrals till we state a simpler formula for Ψ in Proposition 6. However, a few explicit for-
mulas have been obtained for special classes of interval simple games directly using the rather
complicated expression from Definition 1.
Proposition 1 ([22, Theorem 6.3])
Let w ∈ Rn≥0 with
∑n
i=1wi = 1 and fi : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] weakly monotonic increasing functions with
f(0) = 0 and f(1) = 1 for all i ∈ N . Then f : [0, 1]n → [0, 1] defined by x 7→ ∑ni=1wi · fi(xi)
is an interval simple game and satisfies Ψi(f) = wi for all i ∈ N .
Proposition 2 ([22, Theorem 6.4])
For a positive integer n and positive real numbers α1, . . . , αn let f : [0, 1]
n → [0, 1] be defined
by x 7→∏ni=1 xαii and Λ = ∏nj=1 (αj + 1). Then, f is an interval simple game and
Ψi(f) =
1
n! · Λ ·
(n− 1)! + αi · ∑
T⊆N\{i}
|T |! · (n− 1− |T |)! ·
∏
j∈T
(αj + 1)
 (8)
for all i ∈ N .
Of course, it would be interesting to compute Ψ for other parametric classes of interval
simple games. The subsequent simplification in Proposition 6 might be rather useful for that
aim. Prior to stating and proving a simplification of Definition 1, we show that Ψ indeed shares
some properties that we might expect from a meaningful power index.
Proposition 3 (cf. [20, Definition 6.7], [22, Lemma 6.1])
The mapping Ψ is positive, efficient, anonymous, symmetric, and satisfies both the null player
and the transfer property.
Proof. For each x ∈ [0, 1]n, pi ∈ Sn, and i ∈ N , we have f(xpi<i ,1pi≥i) ≥ f(xpi≤i ,1pi>i) and
f(xpi≤i ,0pi>i) ≥ f(xpi<i ,0pi≥i), so that Ψi(v) ≥ 0. Since we will show that Ψ is efficient, we
especially have Ψ(v) 6= 0, so that Ψ is positive.
For any permutation pi ∈ Sn and any 0 ≤ h ≤ n let pi|h := {pi(i) : 1 ≤ i ≤ h}, i.e., the first
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h agents in ordering pi. Then, for any state vector x ∈ [0, 1]n, we have
n∑
i=1
(
v(xpi<i ,1pi≥i)− v(xpi≤i ,1pi>i) + v(xpi≤i ,0pi>i)− v(xpi<i ,0pi≥i)
)
=
n∑
h=1
(
v(xpi|h−1,1−pi|h−1)−v(xpi|h,1−pi|h)
)
+
n∑
h=1
(
v(xpi|h,0−pi|h)−v(xpi|h−1,0−pi|h−1)
)
= v(xpi|0,1−pi|0)− v(xpi|n,1−pi|n) + v(xpi|n,0−pi|n)− v(xpi|0,0−pi|0)
= v(1)− v(x) + v(x)− v(0) = 1− 0 = 1,
so that
∑n
i=1 Ψi(v) = 1, i.e., Ψ is efficient.
The definition of Ψ is obviously anonymous, so that it is also symmetric. If agent i ∈ N
is a null player and pi ∈ Sn arbitrary, then v(xpi<i ,0pi≥i) = v(xpi≤i ,0pi>i) and v(xpi<i ,1pi≥i) =
v(xpi≤i ,1pi>i), so that Ψi(v) = 0, i.e., Ψ satisfies the null player property. Since x + y =
max{x, y} + min{x, y} for all x, y ∈ R and due to the linearity of finite sums and integrals, Ψ
also satisfies the transfer axiom.
Since the proof of Proposition 3 actually shows that the stated properties are even satisfied
for the summation part without integrating we conclude:
Proposition 4 For every α ∈ [0, 1] the mapping Ψa, where a = (α, . . . , α) ∈ [0, 1]n, defined by
Ψai (v) =
1
n!
∑
pi∈Sn
( [
v(api<i ,1pi≥i)− v(api<i ,0pi≥i)
]− [v(api≤i ,1pi>i)− v(api≤i ,0pi>i)] )
for all i ∈ N , is positive, efficient, anonymous, symmetric, and satisfies both the null player
and the transfer property for interval simple games.
In other words, Ψa does not consider all possible vote vectors with equal probability but
just a specific and symmetric one, i.e., ai = aj for all i, j ∈ N . This construction can eas-
ily be generalized by introducing a “symmetric” density function in the integration part of
Definition 1.
Proposition 5 Let f be a [0, 1]n → R≥0 mapping satisfying
∫
[0,1]n
f(x) dx = 1 and f(x) =
f
((
xpi(i)
)
i∈N
)
for all x ∈ [0, 1]n and all pi ∈ Sn. Then, the mapping Ψf defined by
Ψfi (v) =
1
n!
∑
pi∈Sn
∫
[0,1]n
f(x)·([v(xpi<i ,1pi≥i)− v(xpi<i ,0pi≥i)]− [v(xpi≤i ,1pi>i)− v(xpi≤i ,0pi>i)]) dx
for all i ∈ N , is positive, efficient, anonymous, symmetric, and satisfies both the null player
and the transfer property for interval simple games.
The example from Proposition 4 can be interpreted in the context of the construction from
Proposition 5 by using a Dirac measure. In [20] it was conjectured that every power index
for interval simple games that satisfies symmetry, efficiency, the null player property, and the
transfer property coincides with Ψ. However, the two constructions above show that this is
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wrong. To this end we consider the specific interval simple game defined by v(x) = x1x
2
2 for
n ≥ 2 players. It can be easily checked that
Ψ(v) =
(
5
12
,
7
12
, 0, . . . , 0
)
and Ψa(v) =
(
1
2
− α− α
2
2
,
1
2
+
α− α2
2
, 0, . . . , 0
)
for a = (α, . . . , α) with α ∈ [0, 1]. For α 6= 1
2
± 1
2
√
3
we have Ψ(v) 6= Ψa(v). In the setting of
Proposition 5 we can even find way more density functions f with Ψ(v) 6= Ψf (v) than those
already mentioned. We remark that the underlying idea of the constructions of Proposition 4
and Proposition 5 can also be applied to (j, k) simple games. For simple games the analogy of
Proposition 4 is the roll call model where either all players say “yes” or all players say “no”,
corresponding to a = 0 and a = 1, respectively. The analogy of Proposition 5 for simple games is
the roll call model with exchangeable probabilities for vote vectors x ∈ {0, 1}n as proven in [19].
In the light of the characterization result from [24] it would be interesting to know whether the
parametric set of examples from Proposition 5 can be even further generalized. Indeed further
examples satisfying symmetry, efficiency, the null player property, and the transfer property
exist like e.g. v 7→ Ψ(v2), where v2(x) = v(x)2 for all x ∈ [0, 1]n, which is an interval simple
game provided that v is an interval simple game. For (j, k) simple games we remark that
efficiency, symmetry, the null player and the transfer property are sufficiently to determine
the Shapley-Shubik index for (j, 2) simple games, see [9, Theorem 5.1], while for (j, k) simple
games with k > 2 further axioms are needed, see [11, Theorem 1.3]. Additionally axioms for a
characterization of Ψ for interval simple games are given in Section 4.
As shown in the previous subsection for (j, k) simple games, we can easily simplify the
definition of Ψ:
Proposition 6 For every interval simple game v with player set N and every player i ∈ N we
have
Ψi(v) =
∑
i∈S⊆N
(s− 1)!(n− s)!
n!
· [C(v, S)− C(v, S\{i})] , (9)
where C(v, T ) =
∫
[0,1]n
v(1T , x−T )− v(0T , x−T ) d x for all T ⊆ N .
Proof. Setting Sipi := {j ∈ N : pi(j) ≥ pi(i)} we have Sipi = S for exactly (s − 1)!(n − s)!
permutations pi ∈ Sn and an arbitrary set {i} ⊆ S ⊆ N , so that Equation (9) is just a
simplification of Equation (7).
Now we have to catch up on the fact that Ψ is well-defined, i.e., all stated integrals indeed
exist. Using Fubini’s theorem we can easily switch between the formulation in Definition 1 and
that of Proposition 6, so that it suffices to show the existence of∫ 1
0
· · ·
∫ 1
0
v(1T , x−T ) dx1 . . . dxn and
∫ 1
0
· · ·
∫ 1
0
v(0T , x−T ) dx1 . . . dxn
for all T ⊆ N . Here we can use the fact that v is monotone in each coordinate, so that this
property remains true if we iteratively integrate one coordinate after the other. A monotone
[0, 1]→ [0, 1] function is obviously integrable.
So, the monotonicity of interval simple games v is a sufficient condition for the existence of
the integrals. Another reason is that we eventually lose the property that Ψ is positive if we
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allow functions v that are not (weakly) monotone increasing. The very same effect also happens
for simple games. As an example let n = 3 and v map the coalitions {1}, {1, 3}, {1, 2, 3} to 1
and all other coalitions to zero. Using Equation (1) we obtain SSI2(v) = −13 < 0.
4 An axiomatization for the Shapley-Shubik like index
for interval decisions
As we have seen in Proposition 4 and Proposition 5, for interval simple games the axioms
of efficiency (E), symmetry (S), the null player (NP), and the transfer property (T) are not
sufficient to uniquely characterize a power index. Also anonymity (A) and positivity (P) are
satisfied by our parametric examples of power indices. So, for an axiomatization we need some
further axioms. To that end we consider a special class of step functions. In general, a step
function is a function that takes only finitely many values. Here we consider only regular
pavings based on rectangular boxes. To formalize this, we set
Dp =
{
(α0, α1, ..., αp) ∈ [0, 1]p+1 : α0 = 0, αp = 1 and αi < αi+1 for i = 0, 1, ..., p− 1
}
for a given integer p ≥ 1 and Ap =
{
0, 1
2
, 1, 3
2
, . . . , p− 1
2
, p
}n
, where n denotes the number of
players. Given α ∈ Dp, we denote by ω (α) = max1≤h≤p (αh − αh−1) the maximal difference
between two consecutive αh. For each e ∈ Ap and each α ∈ Dp by (α)e we abbreviate the
open box I1 × I2 × · · · × In, where the intervals are given by Ij = {αej} if ej ∈ N and
Ij =
(
αej−1/2, αej+1/2
)
otherwise.8 We denote the closure of (α)e by [α]e, i.e., all open intervals
Ij are replaced by the corresponding closed intervals.
Given a paving of [0, 1]n, described by α ∈ Dp, we assume that a step function is constant
on the interior of every face of one of the boxes.
Definition 2 A function f : [0, 1]n → [0, 1] is a step function if there exists an integer p ≥ 1
and α ∈ Dp such that f is constant on (α)e for all e ∈ Ap. We call α a discretization of f .
Figure 2, in the appendix, shows an example of a step function for n = 2 players and
discretization α =
(
0, 1
4
, 1
)
, i.e., p = 2. The open rectangle
(
0, 1
4
) × (1
4
, 1
)
is denoted by (α)e,
where e =
(
1
2
, 3
2
) ∈ A2. The (closed) edge [0, 14] × {1} is denoted by [α]e, where e = (12 , 2),
and the vertex {1} × {1
4
}
, i.e., the point with coordinates
(
1, 1
4
)
, is denoted by either [α]e or
(α)e, where e = (2, 1). We remark that the number of fractional entries in e ∈ Ap gives the
geometric dimension of the face [α]e (or (α)e). In order to have a simple notation for the full
dimensional boxes we set Ap =
{
1
2
, 3
2
, . . . , p− 1
2
}n
.
Since it would be beneficial to describe a step function by specifying its values on the full
dimensional boxes, i.e., on (α)e for all e ∈ Ap, we introduce the concept of a regular step
function. Here we determine the values of the step function on the faces that are not full
dimensional simply by averaging over the values attained in the interior of all neighbored full
dimensional boxes. This approach allows us to embed any given (j, k) simple game in an
interval simple game, see Definition 4, so that the corresponding power indices coincide, see
Proposition 7.
8Slightly abusing notation, we may also write Ij =
(
αbejc, αdeje
)
.
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Definition 3 A step function f : [0, 1]n → [0, 1] with discretization α ∈ Dp is called regular if
we have f(0) = 0, f(1) = 1, and
f(x) =
∑
e∈E(x)
f(ce)/|E(x)| ∀x ∈ [0, 1]n\{0,1}, (10)
where ce denotes the center
9 of [α]e and E(x) denotes the set of elements e in Ap such that
x ∈ [α]e. If Equation (10) is only satisfied for all x ∈ (0, 1)n, then f is called semi-regular.
We need to specify a regular step function f only on the interior of the full dimensional
boxes (α)e, where e ∈ Ap. Since a step function is constant on those faces it is e.g. sufficient
to specify the value f(ce) at the corresponding center. For all other points in [0, 1]
n, i.e., those
that are on the boundary of at least one of the boxes, we can use Equation (10) to determine
the function value. This average type extension to the boundary, is essential in our context,
since Ψ(v) heavily depends on evaluations of v at the boundary of [0, 1]n.10 Alternatively, we
may replace 0 and 1 by ε and 1− ε, respectively, and consider the limit ε→ 0. Here we prefer
the less technical, but more restrictive, variant of Equation (10).
Note that if a regular step function f is monotone, with given parameters p and α, then
f(x) ≤ f(y) is equivalent to ex ≤ ey for all ex, ey ∈ Ap and all x ∈ (α)ex , y ∈ (α)ey .
Next we show that we can embed each (j, k) simple game v as interval simple game vˆ and
that the corresponding power indices SSI(v) and Ψ(vˆ) coincide.
Definition 4 For integers j, k ≥ 2 let v be a (j, k) simple game for n players. For α =(
0, 1
j
, 2
j
, . . . , j−1
j
, 1
)
let vˆ be the regular step function with discretization α uniquely defined by
vˆ(x) = v(e)/(k − 1) for all x ∈ (α)e¯ and all e¯ ∈ Aj, where e = e¯− 12 · 1. We call vˆ the natural
embedding of v.
It can be easily checked that this embedding transfers the null player property and the
property of symmetric players, i.e., a null player in v is also a null player in vˆ and two symmetric
players in v are also symmetric in vˆ. The [0, 1]n → [0, 1] function vˆ is monotone and satisfies
vˆ(0) = 0 and vˆ(1) = 1,11 i.e., vˆ is an interval simple game.
Proposition 7 For integers j, k ≥ 2 let v be a (j, k) simple game for n players and vˆ its natural
embedding with discretization α, as specified in Definition 4, then SSI(v) = Ψ(vˆ).
Proof. Due to (6) and Equation (9) it suffices to verify the coincidence of the two different
9The center of [α]e is given by
(
αbe1c+αde1e
2 , . . . ,
αbenc+αdene
2
)
.
10We will see latter that boundary points of boxes of the underlying paving that are not boundary points of
[0, 1]n do not play a role for the value of Ψ.
11Since v(0, . . . , 0) = 0 and v(j − 1, . . . , j − 1) = k − 1, the conditions f(0) = 0, f(1) = 1 in Definition 3 are
not necessary for this conclusion.
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expressions for C(v, T ) and C(vˆ, T ) for all T ⊆ N . We compute
C(vˆ, T ) =
∫
[0,1]n
vˆ(1T , x−T )− vˆ(0T , x−T ) d x
=
∑
e∈Aj
∫
(α)e
vˆ(1T , x−T )− vˆ(0T , x−T ) d x
=
1
k − 1 ·
∑
e∈Aj
∫
(α)e
v(1T , e−T )− v(0T , e−T ) d x where e = e¯− 12 · 1
=
1
jn(k − 1) ·
∑
x∈Jn
v(1T , x−T )− v(0T , x−T ) = C(v, T ).
So, in other words we have associated a (j, k) simple game with an interval simple game
that is a step function. For j = 2 there is an even more general statement. For any parameter
τ ∈ (0, 1) we can replace the discretization α = (0, 1
2
, 1
)
by (0, τ, 1).
Proposition 8 For an integer k ≥ 2 and τ ∈ (0, 1) let v be a (2, k) simple game for n
players and vˆ be the regular step function with discretization α = (0, τ, 1) uniquely defined by
vˆ(x) = v(e)/(k − 1) for all x ∈ (α)e¯ and all e¯ ∈ A2, where e = e¯− 12 · 1. Then, SSI(v) = Ψ(vˆ).
Proof. Let v˜ be a TU game, i.e., a mapping 2N → R, which maps ∅ to 0. We associate
v˜ with v by setting v˜(S) = v(S˜)/(k − 1) for all S ⊆ N where S˜ ∈ {0, 1}n is defined for all
i ∈ N by S˜i = 1 if i ∈ S and S˜i = 0 otherwise. With this, vˆ is the regular step function with
discretization α = (0, τ, 1) uniquely defined by vˆ(x) = v˜(e) for all x ∈ (α)e¯ and all e¯ ∈ A2,
where e = e¯ − 1
2
· 1. If v is such that v˜(S) = 1 if T ⊆ S and v˜(S) = 0 otherwise, where
∅ 6= T ⊆ N , i.e., v˜ is a unanimity game, then the null player property, symmetry, and efficiency
give SSIi(v) = Ψi(vˆ) = 1/|T | for all i ∈ T and SSIi(v) = Ψi(vˆ) = 0 otherwise. Note that the
values are independent from τ . Since each TU game can be written as a linear combination of
unanimity games and Ψ is linear, also in general, Ψ(vˆ) does not depend on τ . Using τ = 1
2
we
can use Proposition 7 to conclude SSI(v) = Ψ(vˆ).
We remark that the result is essentially implied by the roll call interpretation for the Shapley
value for TU games, or for k = 2 for the Shapley-Shubik index for simple games, with a
probability of τ for voting “no” and a probability of 1 − τ for voting “yes”, see e.g. [24]. The
finer coincidence of C(vˆ, T ) = C(v, T ) is valid for τ = 1
2
only.
We remark that in [9, Definition 3.7] the author considers a more general definition of a
Shapley-Shubik like index for (j, k) simple games than we have presented here. In general a
so-called numeric evaluation comes into play and our case is called uniform numeric evaluation.
We remark that Proposition 7 can also be generalized in that direction modifying the paving
for the associated step function in a natural way.
The proof of Proposition 8 suggests an even more general statement for (2, k) simple games.
The essential part is that we used a map η from the set of (2, k) simple games into interval
simple games that preserves null players, symmetric players and linearity, i.e., η (
∑
T λT · vT ) =∑
T λT · η (vT ). For each such map η we have SSI(v) = Ψ(η(v)) since we can write v as a
linear combination of unanimity unanimity games. As an application we mention the following
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embedding of a simple game as an interval simple game, which we will use later on, see the
proof of Lemma 1.
Proposition 9 Let v be a simple game for n players and v˜ be the semi-regular step function
(with discretization α = (0, 1)) defined by v˜(x) = 1 if {i : xi = 1} is a winning coalition in v
and v˜(x) = 0 otherwise. Then, SSI(v) = Ψ(v˜).
Our aim is to approximate interval simple games by regular step functions. Given an
interval simple game v : [0, 1]n → [0, 1] and a discretization α ∈ Dp we call a regular step
function f : [0, 1]n → [0, 1] with discretization α an approximation of v if for each e ∈ Ap there
exists a value xe ∈ [α]e such that f(ye) = v(xe) for all ye ∈ (α)e. Of course it is easy to
construct such approximations, i.e., we may take the center xe = ce of [α]e, see Footnote 9 .
Any approximation f of v is an interval simple game, i.e., it is monotone and we have f(0) = 0,
f(1) = 1. Moreover, if players i and j are symmetric in v, then they are symmetric in f and if
player i is a null player in v, then it is a null player in f . The condition f(ye) = v(xe) captures
the idea of an approximation.12
Definition 5 Let v be an interval simple game and
(
fh
)
h∈N a sequence of approximations
with discretizations αh. If limh→∞ ω
(
αh
)
= 0 and limh→∞ supx∈[0,1]n
∣∣v(x)− fh(x)∣∣ = 0, then(
fh
)
h∈N is called an approximation sequence of v. If a least one approximation sequence exists
then v is called approximable.
Note that we have required point-wise convergence in Definition 5. In combination with
Equation (10) for regular step functions, this is quite restrictive but e.g. satisfied by interval
simple games that are continuous. Technically, we might relax the condition of point-wise
convergence so that deviations that do not change the value of Ψ(v) are ignored. To ease the
exposition we do not go into details here.
In the subsequent Subsection 4.1 we introduce a further axiom in Definition 7 that allows
to characterize Ψ on regular step functions, see Theorem 1. In Subsection 4.2 we introduce
another axiom in Definition 9 that allows us to characterize Ψ on approximable interval simple
games, see Theorem 2.
4.1 Homogeneous Increments Sharing
Let v be an interval simple game and S ∈ 2N\{N} a coalition. Then, the potential influence of
the coalition S denoted by ∆v (S, x−S) is defined by ∆v (S, x−S) = v (1S , x−S) − v (0S , x−S).
The potential influence ∆v (S, x−S) of S measures the greatest change in the social decision that
may be observed when voters in S change their respective opinions assuming that the profile of
the voters in N\S is given by x−S. A T -domain is a Cartesian product D =×i∈T [ai, bi] given
some ai, bi ∈ [0, 1], meaning that each voter i ∈ T freely and independently chooses his levels
of approbation from [ai, bi] ⊆ [0, 1].
12Alternatively, we might have also included the supremum or the infimum on [α]e, or some value in between,
as a possible value for f(ye) or require that the approximation get “better” if ω(α) tends to zero.
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Definition 6 Let v be an interval simple game for n players, ∅ ( S ( N a coalition, ε ∈ R≥0,
and D =×i∈N\S [ai, bi] be an (N\S)-domain, where 0 ≤ ai ≤ bi ≤ 1 for all i ∈ N\S. If an
interval simple game u for n players satisfies
• ∀x−S ∈ (0, 1)N\S, ∆v (S, x−S) =

∆u (S , x−S) if x−S /∈×i∈N\S [ai, bi]
∆u (S, x−S) + ε if x−S ∈×i∈N\S (ai, bi)
• ∀T ∈ 2N\ {S} ,∀x−T ∈ (0, 1)N\T , ∆v (T, x−T ) = ∆u (T, x−T ),
then v is a local increment of u and we write u
S,ε,D
↪→ v. For S = ∅ we write u ∅,ε,D↪→ v if
v(x) = u(x) + ε for all x ∈ (0, 1)n, i.e., we are indirectly setting D = [0, 1]n. For S = N we
should have chosen D = ∅, but we choose D = [c, 1]n instead, where c ∈ (0, 1). With this, the
condition for u
S,ε,D
↪→ v is v(x) = u(x) + ε for all x ∈ (c, 1)n.
In words u
S,ε,D
↪→ v means that on the one hand, the potential influence of coalition S increases
by a constant increment ε whenever each voter i ∈ N\S picks his opinion from (ai, bi), but
remains unchanged if the opinion of at least one voter i ∈ N\S is outside of [ai, bi]. It is
then reasonable that the corresponding increment in the collective decision mainly comes from
voters in S and is uniform, local and elsewhere valid on×i∈S (ai, bi). On the other hand, the
potential influence of any other coalition T remains unchanged unless some voters in S show a
full support (xi = 1), or no support (xi = 0). In such situations, the shares by a conceivable
power index from u to v are expected to change accordingly by only uniformly rewarding voters
in S in the expense of voters outside of S. In the extreme cases of S = ∅ and S = N , this
reasoning does not makes sense and we consider uniform changes for a completely symmetric
D.
Definition 7 A power index Φ for interval simple games satisfies the homogeneous increments
sharing (HIS) axiom, if for all ∅ ⊆ S ⊆ N and for all interval simple games u and v such that
u
S,ε,D
↪→ v for some ε > 0 and some (N\S)-domain D we have
Φi (v)− Φi (u) =

λΦ(S) · ε · vol(D) if i ∈ S,
−γΦ(S) · ε · vol(D) if i /∈ S,
(11)
where λΦ(S) and γΦ(S) are two real constants that do only depend on S, i.e., they do neither
depend on u and v nor on ε and D, and vol(D) denotes the volume of D. (Note the special
shapes we assume for D in the case of S = ∅ or S = N .)
The term ε · vol(D) captures the fact that the change in the share of a voter is both
proportional to the magnitude ε of the homogeneous increment and to the (local) volume
vol(D) of the domain on which this change occurs. For simple games the analog of (HIS) is
the axiom of Symmetric Gain-Loss (SymGL) [25, p. 93]. The second part cannot occur for
simple games since we have v(∅) = 0 and v(N) = 1 for every simple game by definition. For
(j, k) simple games the axiom of level change on unanimity games, see [11, Subsection 1.8.2],
is closely related to (HIS).
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Proposition 10 The power index Ψ for interval simple games satisfies (HIS) for
(λΨ(S), γΨ(S)) =
(
(s− 1)!(n− s)!
n!
,
s!(n− s− 1)!
n!
)
(12)
for all ∅ ( S ( N . Moreover, we can set (λΨ(∅), γΨ(∅)) = (λΨ(N), γΨ(N)) = (0, 0).
Proof. Let u, v, S, ε, and D be given such that u
S,ε,D
↪→ v and S /∈ {∅, N}. Due to the formula
for ∆v(·, ·) in Definition 6, we have
C(v, S) =
∫
[0,1]n
v(1S, x−S)− v(0S, x−S) = C(u, S) + ε · vol(D)
and
C(v, T ) =
∫
[0,1]n
v(1T , x−T )− v(0T , x−T ) = C(u, T )
for all T ∈ 2N\{S}. (For T = ∅ we have C(v, ∅) = 0 = C(u, ∅) and for T = N we have
C(v,N) = 1 = C(u,N).) From Equation (9) we then conclude λΨ(S) =
(s−1)!(n−s)!
n!
for the
cases i ∈ S and γΨ(S) = s!(n−s−1)!n! for the cases j /∈ S, where only C(u, S ∪ {j}) is different
from C(v, S ∪ {j}).
For the second part, let u, v, S, ε, and D be given such that u
S,ε,D
↪→ v and S ∈ {∅, N}. Since
Ψ is linear, anonymous, and efficient we have Ψ(u) = Ψ(v).
We remark that Ψ also satisfies (HIS) for negative parameters ε, which is the same as
interchanging the roles of u and v and considering −ε instead.
In the context of simple games a local increment from a simple game u to another simple
game v means that the set of winning coalitions of v, i.e., S ⊆ N with v(S) = 1, consists of
the set of winning coalitions of u and an additional winning coalition that was losing in u. The
effects on the number of swing coalitions, i.e., those with v(S)− v(S\{i}) = 1, when removing
one minimal winning coalition from a simple game are well known, see e.g. [7, Lemma 3.3.12].
To be more precise, let u and v be two simple games such that the winning coalitions of v are
given by the winning coalitions of u and a coalition ∅ ( S ( N that is losing in u. As notation
we write v = u⊕ S. For all i ∈ S and all j ∈ N\S we have
SSIi(v) = SSIi(u) +
(s− 1)!(n− s)!
n!
and SSIj(v) = SSIj(u)− s!(n− s− 1)!
n!
, (13)
respectively. Note that we cannot choose S = ∅ or S = N in that setting.
Lemma 1 If Φ is a power index for interval simple games that are semi-regular step functions
that simultaneously satisfies (E), (NP), and (HIS) and n ≥ 3, then we have
(λΦ(S), γΦ(S)) =
(
(s− 1)!(n− s)!
n!
,
s!(n− s− 1)!
n!
)
(14)
for all ∅ ( S ( N . Moreover, we have λΦ(N) = γΦ(∅) = 0.
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Proof. To each simple game v we associate a semi-regular step function v˜ via v˜ (x) = 1 if
{i ∈ N : xi = 1} is a winning coalition in v and v˜ (x) = 0 otherwise; c.f. Proposition 9.
In the remaining part of the proof we will consider steps v = u⊕ S for simple games u and
v, where we denote the corresponding interval simple games by u˜ and v˜, respectively. We will
prove Equation (14) by induction from s = n−1 to s = 1. Moreover we show at each induction
stage s that SSI(v) = Φ(v˜) whenever all winning coalitions in v are of cardinality greater or
equal to s.
First note that for v = u ⊕ S, going from u˜ to v˜ we apply a local increment construction
by choosing coalition S and defining D = ×i∈N\S [ai, bi] via ai = 0, bi = 1 for all i ∈ N\S,
so that vol(D) = 1. Choosing ε = 1, we can easily check that u˜
S,ε,D
↪→ v˜. (We have for
all xN\S ∈ ×i∈N\S(0, 1), ∆u˜(S, x−S) = u˜(1S, x−S) − u˜(0S, x−S) = 0 since S is losing in u;
∆v˜(S, x−S) = v˜(1S, x−S)− v˜(0S, x−S) = 1− 0 since S is winning in v. For any other coalition
T 6= S, T is winning in v if and only if T is winning in u. Thus, for all xN\T ∈ ×i∈N\T (0, 1),
∆v˜(T, x−T ) = ∆u˜(T, x−T )).
For a moment assume that for u = [n; 1, . . . , 1] and the corresponding interval simple game
u˜ we have Φi(u˜) =
1
n
for all i ∈ N . Now let v = u⊕ S for some coalition S ⊆ N of cardinality
s = n − 1. Since the unique player j in N\S is a null player in v˜, we have Φj(v˜) = 0, so
that γΦ(S) =
s!(n−s−1)!
n!
using (HIS). From efficiency we then conclude λΦ(S) =
(s−1)!(n−s)!
n!
.
Note that SSI(u) = Φ(u˜) and by (HIS), SSI(v) = Φ(v˜). Moreover, SSI(v) = Φ(v˜) whenever
v = u⊕ S1 ⊕ S2 ⊕ ...⊕ Sp for some coalitions Sj each of cardinality n− 1 by applying (HIS) p
times together with (13). So, the induction start is made.
Now let S ⊆ N with 0 < s < n be given. To determine γΦ(S), let u be the simple game
whose winning coalitions are exactly the proper super sets of S. For the corresponding interval
simple game u˜ we have SSI(u) = Φ(u˜) by the induction hypothesis. For v = u ⊕ S we have
that all players in j ∈ N\S are null players in v, so that Φj(v˜) = SSIj(v) = 0. With this,
we easily compute γΦ(S) = Φj(u˜) = SSIj(u) =
s!(n−s−1)!
n!
from (HIS) and (13), which gives
λΦ(S) =
(s−1)!(n−s)!
n!
using efficiency. Both γΦ(S) and λΦ(S) depend only on s. Moreover,
suppose that u is any other simple game whose winning coalitions are of cardinality greater
than s and that v = u⊕ S1 ⊕ S2 ⊕ ...⊕ Sq. Then SSI(u) = Φ(u˜) by induction hypothesis, and
applying (HIS) q times together with (13) yields SSI(v) = Φ(v˜).
Now let us prove our assumption Φi(u˜) =
1
n
for all i ∈ N , where u = [n; 1, . . . , 1]. To this
end, let i and j be two arbitrary but different players in N and set X = N\{i, j}. Define
(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn) = Φ(u˜). As above, player j is a null player in u ⊕ (X ∪ {i}), so that (HIS) and
(NP) give γΦ(X ∪ {i}) = ϕj. From (E) we then conclude λΦ(X ∪ {i}) = ϕj/(n− 1). Similarly
we conclude γΦ(X ∪ {j}) = ϕi and λΦ(X ∪ {i}) = ϕj/(n − 1). Now let u′ = [n; 1, . . . , 1] ⊕
(X ∪ {i})⊕ (X ∪ {j}). From the above constants and (HIS) we conclude Φi(u˜′) = ϕj/(n− 1)
and Φj(u˜′) = ϕi/(n − 1). In v = u′ ⊕ X13 the players i and j are null players so that (HIS)
gives ϕi = ϕj. Since i and j were arbitrary, we have Φi(u˜) =
1
n
for all i ∈ N using efficiency.
For S = ∅ we can choose some ε and D with ε > 0 and vol(D) > 0. Every player i ∈ N
is contained in N\S, so that the value of λΦ(∅) does not change anything. From (E) we then
conclude γΦ(∅) = 0. For S = N it is just the other way round, i.e., every player i ∈ N
13Note that this not the case for exactly two players, i.e,, n = 2.
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is contained in S and the value of γΦ(N) does not change anything. Efficiency then gives
λΦ(N) = 0.
W.l.o.g. we can always assume λΦ(∅) = 0 and γΦ(N) = 0. For n = 1 the statement of
Lemma 1 is also true, since ∅ and N are the only possible subsets of N . For n = 2 players the
axioms (E), (NP), and (HIS) do not determine Φ for interval simple games that are semi-regular
step functions as shown by the following parametric family.
Lemma 2 For a1, a2 ∈ R≥0 with a1 + a2 = 1 let
Φai (v) := ai + aj
∫ 1
0
[v (1i, tj)− v (0i, tj)] dt− ai
∫ 1
0
[v (1j, ti)− v (0j, ti)] dt (15)
for each interval simple game v and i, j ∈ {1, 2}, where ti = t · 1i. Then, Φa satisfies (E),
(NP), and (HIS).
The axioms (E) and (NP) can be checked directly. For (HIS) we mention the corresponding
constants (λΦa({1}), γΦa({1})) = (a2, a2) and (λΦa({2}), γΦa({2})) = (a1, a1) . We remark that
all power indices satisfying (E), (N), and (HIS) for semi-regular step functions can indeed be
parameterized as in Lemma 2.
For n = 2 including the axiom (S) is sufficient for our claim, but the symmetry axiom may
also be replaced by some technically weaker axiom. In the context of simple games this reflects
the fact that (E), (NP), (SymGL) do not characterize the Shapley-Shubik index. However,
note that (HIS) is a stronger requirement than (SymGL) on simple games since the later does
not include the disposition that the constants (λΦ (S) , γΦ (S)) should depend only on Φ and S,
but not on the game where the improvement occurs. Moreover, with at least three players, the
corresponding of (HIS) axiom on simple games characterizes the Shapley-Shubik index when
combined with (E) and (NP).
For later usage in the proof of Theorem 1 we extract the following technical result from the
proof of Lemma 1:
Corollary 1 If Φ is a power index for interval simple games that are semi-regular step func-
tions that simultaneously satisfies (E), (NP), and (HIS) and n ≥ 3, then Φ(0˜) = 1/n, where
0˜(x) = 1 if x = 1 and 0˜(x) = 0 otherwise.
Next we want to prove that (E), (NP), and (HIS) uniquely characterize Ψ within the class
of interval simple games that are semi-regular step functions. To this end we will show how
to obtain any regular step function by a sequence of local increments starting from the zero
function. It will be necessary to also build up our discretization α step by step.
Definition 8 For a given interval simple game v that is a regular step function with discretiza-
tion α ∈ Dp for some integer p > 1 and another discretization α′ =
(
0, αi1 , . . . , αip′−1 , 1
)
, with
i1 < · · · < ip′−1 and 1 ≤ p′ < p, the coarsened interval simple game is given by
vα′(x) = min
{
v(y) : y ∈ (α)e, e ∈ Ap, ie′j−1/2 < ej < ie′j+1/2
}
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for all x ∈ (α′)e′, where e′ ∈ Ap′, i0 = 0, and ip′ = p. If x ∈ [0, 1]n is contained on the
boundary of some boxes with respect to discretization α′, then vα′(x) is uniquely determined by
Equation (10).
We can easily check that vα′ is indeed an interval simple game that is a regular step function.
We will apply this coarsening only for the cases where α′ = (0, α1, . . . , αl−1, 1) for some integer
1 ≤ l ≤ p. Examples are given in the appendix.
Theorem 1 Let Φ be a power index satisfying (E), (NP), and (HIS) for all interval simple
games with n ≥ 3 players that are semi-regular step functions. Then, we have Φ(v) = Ψ(v) for
every interval simple game v that is a regular step function.
Proof. Let us build up the regular step function v step by step assuming that v has a discretiza-
tion α ∈ Dp for some integer p ≥ 1. For each integer 1 ≤ l ≤ p we consider the discretization
αl = (0, α1, . . . , αl−1, 1). For each such l we consider a sequence of local increments, which we
call a phase. At the end of each phase our current interval simple game u is the coarsening of
v with respect to αl, i.e., for l = p the final interval simple game u coincides with v.
For a given e ∈ Ap let l ∈ N be such that ej < l for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n, i.e., e ∈ Al. By ce
we denote the center of [α]e. Note that [α]e ⊆ [αl]e and [α]e is indeed the box, with respect to
discretization α, contained in [αl]e that has the smallest possible coordinates.
We start from the zero interval simple game 0˜ defined by 0˜(x) = 1 if x = 1 and 0˜(x) = 0
otherwise. Due to Corollary 1 we have Φ(0˜) = Ψ(0˜) = 1/n. For each l ≥ 1 we are looking at
the set of all possible e ∈ Al, where at least coordinate is equal to l − 12 . For all such vectors
e, e′ we choose e before e′ if e ≥ e′. For each such e we modify our current interval simple game
u to u′, where both are regular step functions. Here we set u′(x) = u(x) + ε for all x ∈ (αl)e
and u′(x) = u(x) for all x ∈ [0, 1]n\[αl]e, where ε = v(ce) − u(ce). The remaining values u′(x)
are uniquely determined by the property of a regular step function, i.e., by Equation (10).
Applying the subsequent Lemma 4 gives Φ(u′) = Ψ(u′).
The statement that at the end of each phase the current interval simple game u coincides
with the coarsening vαl can inductively be concluded from the monotonicity of v. Moreover, in
all intermediate steps u is always an interval simple game that is a regular step function with
respect to discretization αl.
4.1.1 Uniform changes on subsets of the domain
What is the effect for a given power index Φ if we change the output values v(x) of an interval
simple game uniformly on some full dimensional box for a given discretization? It will turn
out, that the change in Φ(v) is uniquely determined if Φ satisfies (HIS), see Lemma 4, where
we consider regular step functions for technical reasons. This is indeed the outsourced part in
the proof of Theorem 1. Definition 7 cannot be applied directly, but has to applied separately
for all faces of the given full dimension box.
Assume that f : [0, 1]n → [0, 1] is a step function with discretization α ∈ Dp for some
integer p ≥ 1. Let further ε ∈ R be a constant and e¯ ∈ Ap be the vector that describes a
full dimensional box according to the given discretization. Note that the entries of e¯ satisfy
e¯i− 12 ∈ N, i.e., they are fractional. In order to describe the faces of the box [α]e¯ we set F(e¯) ={
e ∈ Ap : e¯i − 12 ≤ ei ≤ e¯i + 12
}
. For e ∈ F(e¯) we set L(e, e¯) = {1 ≤ i ≤ n : ei = e¯i − 12} and
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U(e, e¯) =
{
1 ≤ i ≤ n : ei = e¯i + 12
}
. In words this means that the face [α]e of [α]e¯ is located
on the lower boundary with respect to coordinate direction i if i ∈ L(e, e¯) and on the upper
boundary if i ∈ U(e, e¯). In the cases where i ∈ I(e, e¯) := N\(L(e, e¯)∪U(e, e¯)) the ith coordinate
xi of x ∈ [α]e can attain a continuum of values. If for e ∈ Ap another step function g is given
by g(x) = f(x) + ε for all x ∈ (α)e and g(x) = f(x) otherwise, then we write f (α)e,ε−→ g
or simply f
e,ε−→ g whenever the underlying discretization is clear from the context. Each
such transformation is a local increment
S,ε˜,D
↪→ if S, ε˜, and D are chosen accordingly. To that
end, we refine L(e, e¯) and U(e, e¯) to those indices that are lie on the boundary of [0, 1]n, i.e.,
L(e, e¯) := {i ∈ L(e, e¯) : ei = 0} = {i ∈ N : ei = 0} and U(e, e¯) := {i ∈ U(e, e¯) : ei = p} =
{i ∈ N : ei = p}.
Lemma 3 Let f : [0, 1]n → [0, 1] be a step function with discretization α ∈ Dp, e¯ ∈ Ap,
e ∈ F(e¯), ε ∈ R, f e,ε−→ g, and D = [α]eN\S := ×
j∈N\S
[
αej−1/2, αej+1/2
]
.
(1) If L(e, e¯) 6= ∅ ∧ U(e, e¯) 6= ∅ or L(e, e¯) = ∅ ∧ U(e, e¯) = ∅, then f S,ε˜,D↪→ g for arbitrary
S ∈ 2N and ε˜ = 0.
(2) If U(e, e¯) 6= ∅ and L(e, e¯) = ∅, then f S,ε˜,D↪→ g for S = U(e, e¯) and ε˜ = ε.
(3) If L(e, e¯) 6= ∅ and U(e, e¯) = ∅, then f S,ε˜,D↪→ g for S = L(e, e¯) and ε˜ = −ε.
Proof. First note that L(e, e¯) ∩ U(e, e¯) = ∅, so that the case analysis is exhaustive. For
T ∈ {∅, N} we have ∆(f, x−T ) = ∆(g, x−T ) for all x−T ∈ (0, 1)N\T in general.
Now let T ∈ 2N\{∅, N}. If exists some i ∈ T but i /∈ L(e, e¯) ∪ U(e, e¯), then g(1T , x−T ) =
f(1T , x−T ) and g(0T , x−T ) = f(0T , x−T ) for all x−T ∈ (0, 1)N\T . Similarly, if there exist some
i, j ∈ T with i ∈ L(e, e¯) and j ∈ U(e, e¯), then g(1T , x−T ) = f(1T , x−T ) and g(0T , x−T ) =
f(0T , x−T ) for all x ∈ (0, 1)N\T . Thus, (1) is true and it remains to check the cases T =
L(e, e¯) 6= ∅ or T = U(e, e¯) 6= ∅.
In the following we assume that exactly one of the sets L(e, e¯) and U(e, e¯) is non-empty. If
T = U(e, e¯) 6= ∅, then g(1T , x−T ) = f(1T , x−T )+ε if x−T ∈ (α)eN\T and g(1T , x−T ) = f(1T , x−T )
otherwise. For all x−T ∈ (0, 1)N\T we have g(0T , x−T ) = f(0T , x−T ). If T = L(e, e¯) 6= ∅,
then g(1T , x−T ) = f(1T , x−T ) for all x−T ∈ (0, 1)N\T and g(0T , x−T ) = f(0T , x−T ) + ε for all
x−T ∈ (α)eN\T and g(0T , x−T ) = f(0T , x−T ) otherwise. This gives (2) and (3), respectively.
Corollary 2 Let Φ be a power index satisfying (HIS) for all interval simple games that are
semi-regular step functions, f : [0, 1]n → [0, 1] be an interval simple game that is a semi-regular
step function with discretization α ∈ Dp, e¯ ∈ Ap, e ∈ F(e¯), ε ∈ R>0, and f e,ε−→ g. We have
Φ(f) 6= Φ(g) iff L(e, e¯) = L(e, e¯), U(e, e¯) = U(e, e¯), and L(e, e¯) ∪ U(e, e¯) 6= ∅.
In other words, a transformation f
e,ε−→ g has an effect for a power index Φ, satisfying (HIS)
if and only if the non-empty set of coordinates that is fixed in [α]e lies on the boundary of [0, 1]
n
and ε 6= 0.
Lemma 4 Let Φ be a power index with n ≥ 3 satisfying (HIS), (E), and (NP) for all interval
simple games that are semi-regular step functions and u and u′ be interval simple games that
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are regular step functions with discretization α ∈ Dp that satisfy Φ(u) = Ψ(u). If u′(x) = u(x)
for all x ∈ [0, 1]n\[α]e¯ and u′(x) = u(x) + ε for all x ∈ (α)e¯ for some ε ∈ R≥0 and e¯ ∈ Ap, then
Φ(u′) = Ψ(u′).
Proof. In order to transform u into u′ we apply step of the form
e,ε/|E(ce)|−→ for all faces e ∈ F(e¯)
of [α]e¯, where the normalization ε/|E(ce)| guarantees that the resulting step function u′ is
indeed regular.
We loop over all possible faces e ∈ F(e¯), where we choose e before e′ if e ≥ e′. This
ordering guarantees that
e,ε/|E(ce)|−→ turns an interval simple game into an interval simple game,
i.e., monotonicity is respected. Moreover, we stay in the class of semi-regular step functions.
Thus, given (HIS), (E), and (NP), we can apply Lemma 1 and Lemma 3 to conclude Φ(u˜) =
Ψ(u˜) for all intermediate semi-regular step functions u˜.
Note that in the case where either e¯ = 1
2
·1 or e¯ = (p− 1
2
) ·1 we even have Φ(u) = Φ(u′) and
Ψ(u) = Ψ(u′). In general it is quite hard to explicitly quantify the effect of a transformation as
described in Lemma 4. For some integer l ≥ 2 we consider the discretization α = 1
l
· (0, 1, . . . , l)
as an example. Let n = 3 and e¯ =
(
l − 1
2
, 1
2
, l − 1
2
)
. In Table 1 we have listed the changes of
the corresponding power distribution Φ for all faces of [α]e¯ that matter, see Corollary 2.
face e of e¯ S vol(D) change Φ1 change Φ2 change Φ3
x1 = 1, x3 = 1 {1, 3} l−1 + ε6l − ε3l + ε6l
x1 = 1 {1} l−2 + ε3l2 − ε6l2 − ε6l2
x3 = 1 {3} l−2 − ε6l2 − ε6l2 + ε3l2
x2 = 0 {2} l−2 + ε6l2 − ε3l2 + ε6l2
Table 1: Effect of a uniform increase on some full-dimensional subcube for Φ.
For the special case ε = 1 and l = 2 the players 1 and 3 increase their power by 1
6
, while
player 2 reduces its power by 1
3
. More generally, for e¯ =
(
1
2
· 1L,
(
l − 1
2
) · 1U) for some disjoint
sets L,U 6= ∅ with L ∪ U = N , the total change for Φi is given by∑
{i}⊆T⊆L
− ε
ln−t
· (t− 1)!(n− t)!
n!
+
∑
∅(T⊆L\{i}
ε
ln−t
· t!(n− t− 1)!
n!
+
∑
{i}⊆T⊆U
ε
ln−t
· (t− 1)!(n− t)!
n!
+
∑
∅(T⊆U\{i}
− ε
ln−t
· t!(n− t− 1)!
n!
, (16)
where t = |T |. For ε = 1 and l = 2 this complicated expression simplifies to an overall increase
of (|U |−1)!·(n−|U |)!
n!
for every player i ∈ U and a decrease of |U |!·(n−|U |−1)!
n!
for all other players.
Instead of a combinatorial proof we refer to the power distribution of a (2, 2)-simple game in
Proposition 7 and note that we actually obtain Equation (13) for a simple game (after adding
one winning coalition). For general (j, k) simple games and their natural embedding as an
interval simple game the situation is more complicated. Here we might have L ∪ U 6= N , i.e.,
the full-dimensional boxes of the discretization do not need to meet the boundary of [0, 1]n in
all coordinate directions. Moreover, we are not aware of a generalization of Equation (13) to
(j, k) simple games.
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Finally, we mention that the technical normalization in
e,ε/|E(ce)|−→ , i.e., the division by |E(ce)|
does not have an effect on the resulting power distribution. I.e., due to Corollary 2 we have an
effect only if |E(ce)| = 1.
4.2 A characterization of Ψ
In Theorem 1 we have already characterized Ψ by three axioms on the subset of (regular)
step functions of interval simple games. The idea now is to consider for a given approximable
interval simple game v an approximation sequence (fh)h∈N of regular step functions. Then, fh
tends to v and Ψ(v) should be given by limh→∞Ψ(fh).
Definition 9 A power index Φ is called discretizable (D) if for any approximable interval
simple game v and any approximation sequence
(
fh
)
h∈N the limit limh→∞Φ
(
fh
)
exists and
coincides with Φ(v).
Proposition 11 The power index Ψ is discretizable.
Proof. As argued in Section 3 the integrals in the definition of Ψ even exist applying the
concept of the Riemann integral due to the monotonicity of interval simple games. Since the
Riemann integral itself is defined via limits over sequences of step functions the statement
naturally follows.
For approximation sequences we may also restrict ourselves to uniform discretizations. The
power index Ψ has the limit property of Definition 9 also for more general sequences of (regular)
step functions. However, it makes sense to assume a (seemingly) weaker condition for axiom
(D) if we are able to conclude uniqueness of the power index in the end.
Before we state the final axiomatization we want to state two further examples to highlight
the technical subtleties of power indices for general interval simple games.
Let n ≥ 1 be an integer and v be the interval simple game for n players with v(0) = 0 and
v(x) = 1 for all x ∈ [0, 1]n\{0}. For every ∅ ⊆ T ( N we have C(v, T ) = 0 and C(v,N) = 1,
so that Ψi(v) =
1
n
for all i ∈ N . For every integer p ≥ 1 and every discretization α ∈ Dp there
exists a regular step function f with discretization α and f(ce) = 1 for all e ∈ Ap, where ce
denotes the center of [α]e. For all these step functions we also have Ψ(f)i =
1
n
for all i ∈ N .
However this is not the only choice for the step functions. For each e ∈ Ap, where eh = 12 for
some index h ∈ N , we may set f(ce) = 0 instead of f(ce) = 1, since 0 ∈ [α]e. Even if we ignore
the symmetry assumptions for semi-regular step functions, we can see that those changes of
values of f at the “boundary” of [0, 1]n have an impact on Ψ(f) that tends to zero if ω(α) tends
to zero.
We remark that we can embed every (j, k) simple game as an interval simple game, but for
the other direction we need further conditions, i.e., f(x) = 0 for all x ∈ (α) 1
2
·1 and f(x) = 1
for all x ∈ (α)(p− 12)·1.
Theorem 2 Let Φ be a power index that satisfies (E), (NP), (HIS), and (D) for interval simple
games with n ≥ 3 players. Then we have Φ(v) = Ψ(v) for every interval simple game that is
approximable, i.e., Φ = Ψ.
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Proof. Combine Proposition 11 with Theorem 1 using axiom (D).
We remark that the four stated axioms for Ψ are independent from each other:
• The power index 2 ·Ψ satisfies (NP), (HIS), and (D), but not (E).
• Denote by ED the equal division power index which assigns 1
n
to each player for ever
interval simple game v. Then the power index 1
2
Ψ + 1
2
ED satisfies (E), (HIS) and (D),
but not (NP).
• In Proposition 4 and Proposition 5 we have presented parametric classes of power indices
for interval simple games that satisfy (E), (A), (S), (NP), and (TP). Those from Propo-
sition 5 also satisfy (D). In general they do not satisfy (HIS) as shown by an example
in Section 3. Another concrete example is given by the mapping v 7→ Ψ(v2), as already
mentioned in Section 3, which satisfies (E), (NP), and (D), but not (HIS).
• The construction of a power index that satisfies (E), (NP), and (HIS) but not (D) is a
bit more technically involved. On the set of interval simple games with n players we can
define an equivalence relation, where two interval simple games are in the same class if
one of them can be obtained from the other by a finite sequence of local improvements.
It can be shown that there exists more than one equivalence class if n ≥ 2. For e.g.
v(x) =
∏n
i=1 x
i
i we can define Φi(v) =
1
n(n+1)
· (1, 2, . . . , n) 6= Ψ(v), see Proposition 2. For
every interval simple game u within the same equivalence from v the value of Φ(u) is
defined by Φ(v) via (HIS). Moreover, we cannot lose efficiency by those transformation
and no player can turn into a null player. For every interval simple game u′ that is
contained in a different equivalence class than v, we set Φ(u′) = Ψ(u′), so that Φ satisfies
(E), (NP), and (HIS), but not (D).
We remark that (HIS) is a quite strong axiom. The situation is similar for simple games
and (SymGL), which e.g. implies the transfer axiom, see [25].
5 Conclusion and open problems
The Shapley-Shubik index SSI was designed to evaluate the power distribution in committee
systems drawing binary decisions and is one of the most established power indices. It was
generalized in the literature to decisions with more than two levels of approval in the input and
output, i.e., so-called (j, k) simple games. A fitting axiomatization is still the topic of current
research, see [11]. Special cases for (j, k) are e.g. treated in [4]. If we consider the limit of j and
k to infinity, then we end up with a continuum of options. Those games, that we call interval
simple games here, were e.g. introduced in [20, 22]. In the same papers a generalization of the
Shapley-Shubik index, i.e., Ψ, was proposed and motivated by a generalized version of the roll
call interpretation of the Shapley-Shubik index. Here we prove the first axiomatization for Ψ
and show that the Shapley-Shubik index for simple games, as well as for (j, k) simple games,
occurs as a special discretization. This relation and the closeness of the stated axiomatization to
the classical case suggests to speak of the Shapley-Shubik index for games with interval decisions
that can also be generalized to a value. In that context we have shown that generalized versions
of the classical axioms for simple games, see Proposition 4, are not sufficient any more.
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For the newly introduced axiom (HIS) we gave some justification and remarked its similarity
to the axiom (SymGL) for simple games. However, as shown in e.g. (16), the implications of
(HIS) are much more farreaching than the implications of (SymGL), which is a more direct
axiom tailored for simple games. Again, we mention that we are not aware of a generalization
of Equation (13) to (j, k) simple games and pose this as an open problem.
Our emphasis on step functions is not really essential for our approach. One main mo-
tivation is the proposed natural embedding of (j, k) simple games as interval simple games.
Another motivation was that we do not want to dive too much into the mathematical details of
integrability and approximability. Especially the later topic should be worth a more mathemat-
ical treatment. The introduction of regular step functions was necessary to precisely describe
the above mentioned natural embedding. Nonetheless Ψ can be defined as an n-dimensional
integral, the corresponding power vector is not uniquely defined for an ordinary step functions.
The precise values on lower dimensional faces can be essential. Actually, one can be more pre-
cise, see Corollary 2. I.e., faces that touch the boundary of [0, 1]n are the essential ones. Stated
more directly, the values of an interval simple game v in the interior of its domain are more or
less irrelevant for Ψ. This property might be analyzed and criticized from a more general and
non-technical point of view. However, our rigorous technical analysis uncovers this fact for the
first time, while it is also valid for the SSI variant for (j, k) simple games. I.e., in e.g. a (4, 4)
simple game v for n = 3 voters the value of v(1, 2, 1) can be changed to 0, 1, 2, or 3 without
any direct effect for the power distribution of the players. Of course monotonicity implies some
possible indirect changes of other function values, which then can have an effect for the power
distribution. For simple games there are no “internal” vote vectors. In any case this “boundary
dependence” should be studied and interpreted in more detail. Semi-regular step function are
just a technical artefact in order to allow inductive arguments using (HIS), while being able to
state all technical details and subtleties without glossing over.
Nevertheless the power measurement Ψ can be criticized, we think that it is an reasonable
object that is worth to be studied in more detail. More explicit formulas for special parametric
classes of interval simple games, c.f. Section 3, might be a promising direction for further
research. Of course, also other axiomatizations of the Shapley-Shubik index or the Shapley
value should be studied, whether they can be generalized to interval simple games. In any case,
we think that interval simple games with their natural embedding to (j, k) simple games are a
good yardstick to check how specific some approaches in the current and in the future literature
are when considering specific instances of (j, k) simple games.
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A A working example
Let α =
(
0, 1
4
, 1
2
, 1
)
, n = 2 and consider the regular step function v given by
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4
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4
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v (ce) 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
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In the proof of Theorem 1, it is shown how one can move from the zero interval simple
game to any other interval simple game that is regular. Below we give an implementation of
this construction, for illustration, to determine Ψ(v) for the game v just presented. In the
intermediate steps, only semi-regular step functions are used. Thus, we only provide the values
of the game at the center of each box, or on an edge where the value of game differs from the
one at the center; any other edge is completed using Equation (10).
We do not enumerated all tiny steps of the form f
e,ε−→ g explicitly. Due to Lemma 3 we
only consider steps of the form
S,ε,D
↪→ for all ∅ 6= S ⊆ U(e, e¯) and T,−ε,D↪→ for all ∅ 6= T ⊆ L(e, e¯).
Whenever we have two such steps (for n = 2 we cannot have more), we increase the function
values of the interior of the corresponding rectangle at the second step.
Going through all the details of the inductive construction is rather tedious, but might help
the reader to comprehend the technical details of our definitions and lemmas.
Figure 1: Moves at phase 1
Phase 1
We start with the interval simple game given by u0(x) = 0 for all x ∈ [0, 1]2\ {(1, 1)}, where
we clearly have Ψ(u0) =
(
1
2
, 1
2
)
. Next we consider the local increment u0
∅,0.1,[0,1]2
↪→ u1, so that
Ψ(u1) =
(
1
2
, 1
2
)
; see Figure 1.
Phase 2
At this stage, the current game u = u1 already coincides with v on the box [α](1
2
,
1
2
). We
now consider the discretization α2 =
(
0, 1
4
, 1
)
. We have to order the vectors in A2\
{(
1
2
, 1
2
)}
according to ≥. There are exactly two possibilities: (3
2
, 3
2
)
,
(
3
2
, 1
2
)
,
(
1
2
, 3
2
)
and
(
3
2
, 3
2
)
,
(
1
2
, 3
2
)
,(
3
2
, 1
2
)
. Note that we are dealing with a partial order, i.e.,
(
3
2
, 3
2
)
>
(
3
2
, 1
2
)
and
(
3
2
, 3
2
)
>
(
1
2
, 3
2
)
,
but we cannot compare
(
3
2
, 1
2
)
and
(
1
2
, 3
2
)
. For e =
(
3
2
, 3
2
)
we compute S = {1, 2} and T = ∅,
D = [1
4
, 1]2, and ε = v(c(3
2
,
3
2
))− v(c(1
2
,
1
2
)) = 0.50. Setting u1 S,ε,D↪→ u2 we obtain Ψ(u2) = (1
2
, 1
2
)
.
Similarly, for e =
(
1
2
, 3
2
)
, we have S = {2} and T = {1}. First, u2
{2},0.1,[0, 14 ]
↪→ u3 gives Ψ(u3) =(
1
2
− 1
80
, 1
2
+ 1
80
)
. Next u3
{1},−0.1,[ 14 ,1]
↪→ u4 implies Ψ(u4) = (39
80
− 3
80
, 41
80
+ 3
80
)
. For e =
(
3
2
, 1
2
)
, we
have S = {1} and T = {2}. The first move to update the value of the game in the box [α]e first
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Figure 2: Moves at phase 2
consists in u4
{1},0.2,[0, 14 ]
↪→ u5 gives Ψ(u5) = ( 9
20
+ 2
80
, 11
20
− 2
80
)
. Finally, u5
{2},−0.2,[ 14 ,1]
↪→ u6 implies
Ψ(u6) =
(
19
40
+ 6
80
, 21
40
− 6
80
)
. Figure 2 shows the entire sequence of moves at this phase.
Phase 3
Note that the current game u = u6 already coincides with v on the box [α]e for e ∈ A2.
We consider the discretization α = α3 =
(
0, 1
4
, 1
2
, 1
)
. We have to order the vectors in A3\A2
according to ≥. As above, there are several possibilities that emerge to the same result. Here
we consider
(
5
2
, 5
2
)
,
(
3
2
, 5
2
)
,
(
1
2
, 5
2
)
,
(
5
2
, 3
2
)
,
(
5
2
, 3
2
)
, and
(
5
2
, 1
2
)
. For e =
(
5
2
, 5
2
)
we have S = {1, 2}
and T = ∅ and u6
N,0.3,
[
1
2
,1
]2
↪→ u7. It follows that Ψ(u7) = (11
20
, 9
20
)
. Next for e =
(
3
2
, 5
2
)
, we
have S = {2} and T = ∅. Setting u7
{2},0.1,[ 14 , 12 ]
↪→ u8 gives Ψ(u8) = (11
20
− 1
80
, 9
20
+ 1
80
)
. For
e =
(
1
2
, 5
2
)
, we have S = {2} and T = {1}. The first move to update the value of the
game in [α]e first consists in u
8
{2},0.2,[0, 14 ]
↪→ u9 which gives Ψ(u9) = (43
80
− 2
80
, 37
80
+ 2
80
)
. Next,
u9
{1},−0.2,[ 12 ,1]
↪→ u10 yields Ψ(u10) = (41
80
− 2
40
, 39
80
+ 2
40
)
. For e =
(
5
2
, 3
2
)
, we have S = {1} and
T = ∅. Setting u10
{1},0.2,[ 14 , 12 ]
↪→ u11 gives Ψ(u11) = (37
80
+ 2
80
, 43
80
− 2
80
)
. For e =
(
5
2
, 1
2
)
, we have
S = {1} and T = {2}. Two moves are needed to update the value of the game in [α]e.
First, u11
{1},0.2,[0, 14 ]
↪→ u12 gives Ψ(u12) = (39
80
+ 2
80
, 41
80
− 2
80
)
. Finally, u12
{2},−0.2,[ 12 ,1]
↪→ u13 leads
Ψ(u13) =
(
41
80
+ 2
40
, 39
80
− 2
40
)
=
(
9
16
, 7
16
)
. All those moves are illustrated in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Moves at phase 3
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